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ONE BOSS OR MANY? DECISION MAKING AND
COORDINATION IN THE MULTI-PLANT FIRM
Lynn Hunnicutt

ABSTRACT

Multi-plant organizations have trouble including both local and global information in their
decisions. Outlets know local conditions but headquarters is able to coordinate outlets. In allocating
decision-making power, firms must balance coordination and flexibility. I model this tradeoff, and
show that the decentralized firm may standardize to avoid costs due to miscoordination. That is,
increasingly variable local conditions cause decentralized choices to become less variable. Ex ante,
decentralization is more profitable; neither form dominates ex post.

Signals from outlets to

headquarters improve the performance of the centralized firm, but one can always find conditions
under which decentralization is preferred.
JEL Classifications: L23, D21

Key words: decentralization, information, multi-plant firms

ONE BOSS OR MANY? DECISION MAKING AND
COORDINATION IN THE MULTI-PLANT FIRM
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Introduction

All organizations base decisions on local and global information, but when the organization
consists of several plants, it often has trouble accounting for both sets of facts. Generally,
each plant is better informed regarding conditions specific to its locality, while headquarters is better able to account for global issues affecting the coordination of outlets. Within
the organization, decision-making power must be allocated,either to individual plants or to
headquarters. This creates a tradeoff between using accurate local information and coordinating outlets. This paper describes and models the tradeoff between using local information
and coordinating outlets.
Consider a firrn producing several versions (brands) of the same product - aut om 0-biles, for example. Suppose that each brand is produced on a separate assembly line with ·
unique characteristics, and that communication between lines, . and between lines and headquarters is limited. These assumptions suggest that detailed knowledge of the characteristics
of each brand deteriorates as it. moves from that brand's line to the firm's other lines and
to hea.dquarters.

The firm would like each line to exploit this detailed knowledge, but it

recognizes that altering the characteristics or quantities produced of one brand might reduce '
sales of others, so that accounting for production conditions of one brand may have both a
positive and a negative influence on revenue.
For example, automaker Saturn has recently introduced its L-Series sedan, In an
attempt to retain cllstorners trading in its popular (and smaller) S-Series a.utos. Its objective
is to move existing Saturn owners up to a larger and more expensive auto, while attracting
new customers for both types of cars it offers. There is a benefit (in terms of new customers
attracted) to meeting customer demand for a larger, more comfortable automobile, but a

*This research was supported by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State ~niversity, Log~n, Utah
84322-4810. I thank R. Preston McAfee, Rajshree Agarwal, Gretchen Kalsow, Kala Krishna, and Leshe Marx.
The usual caveat applies.
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potential cost to Saturn as well.

If brand managers for the L-Series produce too many

autos and drive down their price, the market for S-Series autos may be adversely affected.
Coordination between production lines is needed to ensure that brands do not impinge on
each other, but managers for each model need to be empowered to produce efficiently and
to meet the demands of their customers.

With the introduction of a second line of autos,

Saturn has created a tradeoff between coordinating production lines and exploiting detailed
knowledge of production and demand conditions.
The coordinating vs.
in regulatory settings.

exploiting location-specific information problem also anses

Suppose, for example, that a region is considering the best way to

abate pollution. Local authorities know the cost of abating pollution in their areas , while the
central authority does not. The central authority is empowered to set pollution standards
and make transfers between locations to reward (punish) abatement activities on the part
of local authorities.

In a centralized system, the regional authority is able to coordinate

abatement activities between areas, while a decentralized system allows local governments to
respond to specific abatement cost conditions in their areas. Yates (2000) uses this setting
to show that when pollution dissipates rapidly or not at all, coordinating responses is most
important , so that centralized leadership dominates.

On the other hand, when pollution

dissipates at a moderate pace, coordination is relatively less important , so that the flexibility
available under decentralized leadership makes it the more profitable form.
The model presented in section 2 describes a firm which may be centralized in which
case headquarters makes relevant production decisions, or decentralized in which case each
outlet (plant, production line) makes its own production decisions. In the centralized organization, local information is unavailable, although the effect of i on its neighbors is accounted
for. Each outlet in the decentralized organization takes its own local information into ac-
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count , but not the information of other outlets. To model this , I assume no communication
between outlets. 1

Thus , the decentralized organization will not be perfectly coordinated,

although its (partial) response to brand-specific (local) conditions will be more accurate.
In a first best world, headquarters would have enough information processing capacity to balance both local and global information in its decision making. In reality, the
processing power needed to incorporate all information affecting various outlets can be impossibly large, so that headquarters usually leaves out some local information in making
decisions (Vayanos (1999), Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991)). Even when headquarters is
able to receive and process all local information, incentive issues sometimes create reporting
problems that make the firm less profitable than it could be. See, for example Laffont and
Martimort (1998) (informational rent to outlets due to limits to communication and possible
collusion by outlets against headquarters) , McAfee and McMillan (1995) (informational rent
to outlets· due to padding of cost reports) , Klibanoff and Poitevin (1996) (outlet misrepresentation of private information caused by inability of headquarters to commit to binding
contracts), and Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1997) (cost to centralization due
to loss of control over firm decisions).
Setting aside incentive problems, decentralized decision making implies that each
outlet will exploit its particular local information. But then coordinating outlets to achieve
the best global outcome, in the absence of a central decision maker, will be problematic. The
effect of miscoordination in the decentralized organization is considered by Kollman, Miller,
1 No communication captures the difficulty decentralized decision makers have in coordinating their activities. Limited communication raises the question of who talks to whom, which leads to a graph-theoretic
problem with organizational complexity rising very quickly with the number of outlets. For models of interand intra-firm networks using graph theory, see Kranton and JVIinehart (1996), DeCanio, Watkins , JVIitchell,
Amir-Atefi, and Dibble (1998) and DeCanio and Watkins (1996). As long as communication is difficult under
decentralization, the thought experiment of no communication should prove instructive.
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and Page (1999) (search for optimal policy; decentralization may lead to local optimum
instead of global optimum), and Chang and Harrington Jr. (1999) (outlets choose which
type of consumer to serve - decentralized outlets may settle on less-profitable type).
The revelation principle demonstrates that as long as transmitting and processing
information is cost less a firm with a single decision maker can imitate a firm with several
centers of authority, so that centralization weakly dominates decentralization (Green and
Laffont (1986) , Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990)). As noted in Laffont and Martimort
(1998) , transmitting information is not cost less , which gives scope to organizational design
and the possibility of decentralization. 2 My model assumes imperfect communication between outlets and headquarters, so that decentralization will be preferred when a flexible
response to local conditions is desirable. On the other hand, conflicts between decentralized
decision makers sometimes arise, so that the coordinated actions dictated by headquarters
may make centralization more profitable.
Aoki (1986) presents a model in which the firm centralizes as local conditions become
increasingly uncertain. 3 The model presented in this paper demonstrates that as an alternative to centralization decentralized firms sometimes standardize in the face of increasingly
uncertain local conditions. The standardization alternative allows the decentralized firm
to maintain the flexibility gained from many decision makers, but achieve the coordination
available to centralized organizations. 4 In effect, outlets which are empowered to make their
2 A large literature exists regarding the effects of costly information transmission. There are two types
of costs, those due to delay and those due to message space requirements. Models containing the first cost
include Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Radner (1993), Van Zandt and Radner (1995). The second cost is
considered in Marschak and Reichelstein (1998), Laffont and Martimort (1998), and Melumad et al. (1997).
An elegant model of communication and decision making is presented by Carter (1995), who characterizes
the value of different decision-making arrangements.
3This result is demonstrated using a principal-agent framework in Baiman, Larcker, and Rajan (1995).
4Because standardization is an option for the decentralized firm, it is straightforward to show that ex
ante, decentralization weakly dominates centralization.
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own decisions sometimes optimally ignore local conditions and behave as if they were being
directed by a less well-informed headquarters. Texas Instruments, for example, standardized
all production facilities of its DRAM chips. Individual facilities were probably more profit able if each were customized to its local environment. TI chose to ignore local information,
because the gains from coordination offset the reduced flexibility. 5
The model presented in section 2 generates Aoki's result that when the cost of
miscoordination is small, the firm will choose to decentralize. Going further , I show that
when local conditions ("emergent events" ) become more variable, miscoordination becomes
more costly, and predictability matters more. As noted above , when predictability matters ,
outlets t end t o "standardize" (limit and/or reduce their flexibility). As in Carter (1995) ,
allowing outlets to respond to privately available information improves profits. Finally, I
allow for the possibility of signals from outlets to headquarters, which enable the central
decision maker to respond (imperfectly) to local conditions. When signals are perfect the
firm will usually, although not always, centralize.

2

The Model

I will use team theory to model a multi-plant firm seeking to maximize profits. Because
strategic behavior has been extensively studied, I follow Van Zandt (1995) and Vayanos
(1999) and abstract from it in order to concentrate on other factors infiuencing the centralization/ decentralization decision. Additionally, since I am modeling within-firm interactions ,
the relationship between the agents in this model is assumed to continue into the (unmodeled) future , so that the threat of future punishment will enforce good (i.e. non-strategic)
5 Evidently, even these gains from standardization did not improve profitability greatly, as Texas Instruments sold its DRAM production facilities to Micron Technology, Inc. in 1998.
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behavior during the period modeled here.

2.1

General Form

Each outlet 's profit is given by P - Ai, where P

=

P(Xl ' X2, ... , xn) represents the revenue the

firm receives , which is affected by the firm 's choice of the x/so Each
the amount

X

Xi

can be thought of as

of a particular type i of good the firm chooses to produce and sell. Types are

selected by the firm before the decisions modeled here are considered, so that for purposes
of this model they are given exogenously.

Saturn, for example, now offers two types of

automobile, the S-series and the L-series. Each outlet produces and sells a single version of
the product. The firm's problem is to choose how much of each type to sell, given that each
of them affects the firm's revenue. For ease of exposition, I present a firm selling two types
(models) of the same good (automobile) , although the results generalize to more than two.
In choosing profit-maximizing quantities , the firm may take two forms. It can be
centralized, in which case headquarters chooses production/sale amounts for both outlets
and is able to coordinate perfectly between them, or it can ' decentralize and allow outlets to
make their own decisions regarding amount to produce/sell. When the firm decentralizes,
each outlet is able to respond to local conditions (Ai) which the centralized firm cannot
observe and respond to.
Local conditions Ai may represent demand conditions, such as the size of the prospective market.

They may also represent cost conditions, in which case we may think of Ai

as the marginal cost for each outlet.

We assume that each production line knows its own

marginal cost with certainty, but not the costs of the other line, and that headquarters
does not know the marginal cost of either production line with certainty. Teece (1996) has
pointed out that detailed knowledge of production conditions is tacit and therefore difficult
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to transmit , so that assuming that outlet i has better knowledge of Ai than outlet j and than
headquarters seems reasonable.
Profit for each outlet is thus given by P(XI ' X2)Xi - AiXi, and the firm 's profit is

outlet , taking into account the effect of each outlet 's actions on the other but not the effect of
(unknown) local conditions. The decentralized firm also maximizes profits at each outlet , but
accounts for local conditions rather than the effect of decisions on other outlets. To capture
this tradeoff, I assume that headquarters uses the expected value of local shocks (EAi) in
the firm 's objective function. Thus , the centralized firm 's objective function is p( xl, X2) (Xl +

X2) - XIEAI - X2EA2· When the firm is decentralized, outlets produce and sell without
knowing the other's choice, so that outlet 1 uses EX2 , and outlet 2 uses EXI in place of their

For comparison, I list first best choices, when the firm is able to coordinate and respond to

Maximizing the profit functions as given, and concentrating on the choice of Xl (since

X2 can easily be obtained by switching subscripts) we obtain the following:

and

For notational convenience, define pC = p( x~, x 2), pd = p( xt, x~), pt
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p* = p(

xr x2)·

From these choices, we see immediately that the decentralized firm is able

to respond directly to local shocks (Ai). Headquarters , on the other hand , responds only
indirectly through the effect of local shocks on the expected value of local conditions (EAi).
When flexibility is important, the firm should decentralize.
If we assume that pC = p*

= pt ,

we can highlight the advantages and disadvantages

of centralization and decentralization. In this case, it is easy to show that

(1)
and

Notice that the centralized choice is different from optimal only inasmuch as local
conditions (AI and A2) are different from their expected values. When local conditions vary
little, headquarters can achieve choices that are quite close to optimal. This is not surprising,
as headquarters' approximate knowledge of local conditions is better, the closer are realized
conditions to expectations.
The decentralized choice is different from optimal in three ways. First , outlet one is
forced to use its expectation of outlet two 's production/sales, instead of its realized value.
This difference is mediated by the effect that outlet one's choice has on revenue, and is
represented by the first term in equation 2 , d~ (EX2 - X2). Second, the optimal choice of
production at outlet one directly affects the optimal choice made for outlet two. This crossoutlet effect is accounted for by inclusion of the term ~ in the optimal choice for outlet one.
Since the decentralized firm cannot take this cross-outlet effect into account , its choice will
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be different from optimal by the second term given in equation 2, ~(P+X2::2 -A2). Finally,
note that outlet one's choice affects firm revenue which in turn helps determine outlet two's
choice. This indirect effect (through firm revenue) is given by the third term, which includes
the direct effect of Xl on X2'~~~' and is mediated by the effect of outlet production/sales on
.

pnce

[)p / [)X2

dp / dxl .

The essence of the coordination advantage available to headquarters is that it is better
able to exploit somewhat accurate information than are the outlets. If local conditions are
not too variable (AI and A2 are close to EA1 and EA2 respectively), centralized decision
making will lead to choices that are close to optimal, since both

x~

and x 2 approach their

optimal values. This is not true in the decentralized firm, as it has no way to coordinate
outlets, and this problem does not disappear when local conditions stabilize around their
expected values. While Al is known with certainty by outlet one, it has no way to gain
information on A2 and x~ . This inability to coordinate makes outlet one respond incorrectly
to conditions in the other market and to the choice made by outlet two. Thus , in some sense
outlet one's response to its own local conditions is incorrect.
The cost of incorrect responses depends on the size of ~ddpd,
the responsiveness of
Xl
dpd

revenue to a change in the amount produced by outlet one. When dx~ = k (a constant) ,
it is straightforward to show that varxt = ~2[varA1

+ varpt - 2COV(A1,pt)]. Thus ,when

k < 1, varxf is likely larger than var AI , and increasingly variable local conditions (rising

var AI) lead to an increasingly variable choice of location by outlet one (rising varxt). This
condition, k < 1, suggests that revenue (as perceived by outlet one) is not very responsive
to outlet one's production choice. When outlet one does not see its choice affecting revenue
very much it is better off responding, and perhaps even over-responding to local conditions.
On the other hand , if k > 1, revenue is greatly affected by outlet one's production choice,
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and outlet 1's action does not respond as flexibly to increasingly variable local conditions.
That is , varxt may not rise even when var)'1 increases greatly. When outlet one's choice has
a large effect on revenue, the range of high-revenue choices for outlet one are quite limited.
The gains to a flexible response are offset by costly miscoordination, so that the firm is better
off when outlet one stays within a narrow range of production choices.
Since the centralized firm does not respond directly to local conditions , decentralized
choices are at least as variable as those made by the centralized firm. In the limit , the cost
to miscoordination is infinitely large

(I ~~~ I

---t

(0), which narrows the range of high revenue

output choices to a single amount. In this case, the decentralized firm does not respond to
local conditions at all. When predictability matters , the firm appears centralized, even when
it is not.
One might expect the variability of the decentralized location choice to fall as local
conditions become more variable, 6 especially when the gain in flexibility is outweighed by
the cost of miscoordination (as measured through ~~:). If the cost of miscoordination is not
constant, the decentralized firm may indeed standardize as local conditions become more
variable. Standardization occurs when, in the face of increasingly variable local conditions,
the costliness of miscoordination rises more quickly than the gains from a more flexible
response. If responding to 'changing demand conditions for L-series sedans adversely affects
S-series sales, Saturn may not wish to respond to such conditions. In fact, if changing
demand conditions for L-series sedans increase the likelihood of a miscoordinated response
between the two models, Saturn may actually reduce the responsiveness of the L-series line
to variable demand conditions.
6This result is ruled out when k < 1, that is when revenue is not very responsive to outlet one's choice.
For k > 1, it mayor may not be true.
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Result 1 As local conditions become more variable, the decentralized firm will standardize

if the cost of miscoordination is larger than the gains to increased flexibility.
Proof: The cost of miscoordination is given by

~~!.

Observe that

var(x~)

=

var

(dPt~ldXl) +

(dP{jddXl) - 2cov (dPt~~xl ' dPl/dXl) so that var(x~) is negatively related to var(Al) when
var( dPI}j1d ) falls as var Al rises. When the variability of dPIdj1d rises faster than the varivar

Xl

Xl

ability of Al we can conclude that outlet one reduces its responsiveness to local conditions as
Q.E.D.

those conditions become more variable.

Earlier, we saw that when miscoordination is infinitely costly, the decentralized firm
will not respond to local conditions. This result goes even further, and shows that even when
miscoordination is not infinitely costly, the decentralized firm may reduce its responsiveness ,
since standardization is a way to reduce the risk of costly miscoordination. The production
line for L-series cars , may be better off ignoring changes in demand conditions or the cost of
production Ai , in order to maintain a coordinated strategy with the line producing S-series
autos. In effect, the decentralized firm behaves as if it were centralized, even when it is not.
As predictibility becomes more important , outlets with freedom to select their own actions
may behave as if they were being told what to do.

2.2

A Linear Example

In order to obtain closed-form solutions to each outlet's problem, and to illustrate the paper's
second main result, I posit the simplest demand structure possible, a linear demand curve,
p

= a - b(Xl + X2). Profits generated at outlet 1 are given by

7fl

= (a - b(Xl + X2) -

AI) X 1. This specific form of demand structure enables me to show that even under the best
of circumstances, it is not possible to say that centralization (decentralization) is always
preferrable. As noted above, and as will be true here, decentralization is ex ante preferrable,
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since decentralized outlets always have the option of ignoring local conditions and behaving as
if they were directed by headquarters. Ex post, even when decentralized outlets are perfectly
able to coordinate their responses , centralization occasionally leads to higher profits.
Substituting in the expected value of local conditions EA.! for the centralized firm,
and the expected choice of outlet two

EX2

for the decentralized firm, and maximizing the

resulting profit functions , we obtain

Since Exf

= x~,

outlets choosing their own locations have the option to behave as if they

were being directed by a central coordinator. As above, the decentralized firm can imitate
the centralized firm , and is therefore ex ante more profitable. 8

As long as dxf / dxj = 0 at

the optimum, the risk of misccoordinated responses in the decentralized firm does not offset
the advantage of increased flexibility. Since I am more interested in ex post profitability, and
since I assume that outlets have no way to coordinate their actions, outlet 1 may choose a
"centralized" position, while outlet 2 responds to its local conditions. Thus, decentralization
may be ex post less profitable than centralization. 9
Since x~ contains only expected values, the centralized firm is completely predictable.
71 assume that dx]j dX2
XC
1

= [

= dX2/ dX1 = 0 at

equilibrium. If these terms are not zero at equilibrium, then

(a-E>" 1)(1+dx l /d x 2)+E>" 2-E>"1
]
b[3+dx 2/ d Xl +dxl/d x 2+(dxI/ dx 2 )(dx2 /dx d l .

8Plugging in the optimal values to the profit functions, we see that EIId - EIIc = it; {var(Al - A2)} > O.
9 Allowing even limited communication between outlets increases the chances of decentralization being ex
post preferred. In a decentralized system , the number of messages that must be exchanged rises rapidly as
the number of outlets rises , however creating a different set of problems. See Radner (1993), Marschak and
Reichelstein (1998) for two approaches to the minimizing message costs problem.

13

An outside observer can predict the centralized firm 's choices even before local conditions
are realized. Inasmuch as predictability matters, centralization will be preferred.
The following facts are derived directly from the firm's optimal choices:

Result 2

1. more costly miscoordination (larger b) makes the decentralized firm less re-

sponsive to both increased size and variability of local shocks.

2. Outlet one's location is larger (smaller) under centralization when realized local conditions are larger (smaller) than expected. x~

> «)xf

¢:?

Al

> «)EAI

3. The relationship between expected local conditions determines the relationship between
centralized outlet positions. x~

4.

>

«)x~

¢:?

EA2

> «)EAI

D ecentralized outlet positions depend on relationships between both expected and realized
local conditions. xf

>

«)x~

¢:?

EA2

+ A2 >

«)EAI

+ AI'

Proof:
1. xf - Exf = 2Ib(EAI - AI)' which proves that as b (the cost of miscoordination) rises,
decentralized choices are closer and closer to their expected values. varxf
so that when b

>

=

4!2 var AI,

~ , variability of decentralized location choices rises by less than the

increased variability of local shocks.
2. inspection of the optimal choices for the decentralized and centralized firms, plus a little
algebra proves this result.
3. inspection of the optimal choices for the decentralized and centralized firms, plus a little
algebra proves this result.
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4. inspection of the optimal choices for the decentralized and centralized firms, plus a little
algebra proves this result.

As in the general case, the decentralized firm responds to increasingly variable local
conditions as long as miscoordination is not costly (b < 1/2). As revenue becomes more
responsive to an outlet's choice (b rises) , miscoordination becomes more costly, causing the
firm's choices to become more and more predictable. In the limit the decentralized firm is
entirely predictable and identical to the centralized firm.
Not surprisingly, knowing the relationships of EA1 to EA2 allows one to predict the
output choices the centralized firm will make, but not the choices the decentralized firm will
make. It is possible that we could see x~ > x~, but xf < x~. When predictability in the
output choices of outlets matters , the firm should centralize.
Next , we consider an alternative centralized organization, in which outlets send some
signal to headquarters indicating the deviation of local conditions from expected. This should
make centralization more profitable, both ex ante and ex post, as local conditions may now
be (imperfectly) observed by headquarters. I assume that outlets send signal Si = Ai - EAi
to headquarters. One can think of this as a daily report regarding equipment maintenance
and input quality, or as a monthly demographic report on customers and economic conditions
in an outlet's sales area.
Unfortunately, since much knowledge regarding local conditions is tacit, all information regarding production conditions cannot be communicated in a finite report. 10 The
signal received by headquarters is given by

Si =

Si

+ Ci ,

where

Ci

is a normally distrib-

uted random variable with mean 0 and variance CY;' Will this communication make it exlOTransfer of knowledge within and between firms has been considered by several authors, especially as it
relates to Japanese industrial structure. See, for example, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) ,Audretsch and
Stephan (1996), Teece (1996), Hippel (1988), Granovetter (1985).
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ante profitable to centralize? Perhaps. Calculating the difference in expected profits gives

ETId - ETIe

3~b( -7var(AI - A2) - 4( varA I + varA2)

=

is perfect (a 2

=

+ 4(ar + a~)).

When signal reception

0), this difference is negative, so that centralization is indeed ex ante more

profitable. By allowing signals, we increase headquarters' flexibility enough to allow it to
emulate the decentralized firm.

The coordination advantage of the centralized firm then

causes it to dominate decentralization.

Unfortunately, noisy signals (large a;) may cause

the centralized firm to coordinate on the wrong output choices (Xl, X2). Because the signal
from outlet i affects both Xi and Xj, the centralized firm may miscue both outlets when it
receives an inaccurate signal.

Noisy signals may be costly enough that decentralization

would be preferred ex ante.
Considering ex post profitability, one can show that in some cases centralization is
preferred, while in others the decentralized firm is more profitable. However, even under the
best of circumstances, neither organization will always be more profitable. I have considered
two polar cases , when local conditions do not vary (EAi
signal reception is perfect (Si

=

=

Ai for both outlets), and when

Si for both outlets) . In the first case, one would expect

decentralization to be more profitable, since each outlet's prediction of the other's location
choice will be perfect (i.e. the firm is perfectly able to coordinate and respond flexibly).
Imperfect signals may get in the way for the centralized firm, so that one would expect
centralization to be less profitable. In fact, centralization turns out to be less profitable as
long as the signals received from each outlet are equally noisy. There are occasions, however,
when a perfect signal from one outlet makes centralization more profitable ex post.
Result 3 When local conditions do not vary (Ai

= E Ai), and assuming similar reception

from both outlets, decentralized profits will be larger.
Proof: TId-IF

=

ib[(SI+s2)(-a+sl+s2)+SI(5A2-4AI)+S2(5AI-4A2)). Whensl

=

s2

=

0,
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rr d

=

rrc.

Given our assumption that

EAi =

0 is a perfect signal, so that the firm

Ai , Si =

can coordinate perfectly and respond to local conditions no matter who makes decisions . If
reception from both outlets is similar, then
and d(rr;~rrC)

=

4
-a+2(Sl +s922- ),2+5),1.

d(rrd_rrc)

<
_

-a+2(Sl +S2)
9b
-

an d

dS1

<

0 and

WLOG assume

d(rrd_rrc)
dS2

Sl =1=

.

rr d - rr c

4A1 -

o.

rr d

-

rr c ,

d(rr;~rrC)

5A2

B t th' . l' th t
U
'ts 'tmp 'tes a

when the worsening of one of the signals reduces
reduction and

S2 =1=

=

4

-a+2(Sl +S;2- ),1 +5),2

~ O. Then

d(rrd_rrc)
dS2

-

4A2 -

d(rrd_rrc)
dS1

5A1 :::;

>

0

.

E

0,

ven

the other more than offsets the

increases. Decentralization will eventually be more profitable. Q.E.D.

This result does not rule out the possibility that centralization can occasionally dominate decentralization. Because we do not know the signs of d(rr:~rrC), when reception from
one location (say 81) worsens while that of the other location (82) does not change, centralization may become (for some realizations of local conditions and corresponding signals)
more profitable. l l These accidental combinations of local conditions and signal quality that
make centralization more profitable occur only rarely, but cannot be ruled out completely.
In the second case (perfect signal reception), the centralized firm should be more
profitable, as it adds the ability to respond perfectly to local conditions to its coordinating
skills. The following result proves this intuition (almost always) correct.
Result 4 When the central decision maker's reception of signals is perfect, the centralized

firm will generally be more profitable.

Proof: If reception is perfect, then

C1

o and

the signal received (8i) 'ts g'tven by

11 Because the signal received from both outlets affects Xl, a faulty signal from outlet two could have
large effect on the choice made by outlet one, and thus on centralized profits.

i:\.
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Using the second form ) it is easy to show that when Ai = EAi) lId = lI c . Using the first form )

d(I1d-IJC)

and d(I1d_I1c) = -5 8 2+ 48 1 WLOG assume 8 >
dA2
18b
·
1 d
d
O II
- I1 C) 28 unce,,..+l>a2n. AddOt
d(I1ddA1_I1c) < 0 ) whOl
th e s2gn 0 jd(I1dA2
(ld(I1dA1-I1 )I 2 e
2 20na y m2n

we see that

d Al

=

-58) +482

18b

C

0

min{ 81 2b
-82
'

8
81+ 2}

18b

0

0

0

8

2·

Then

d-I1 )I)
Id(I1dA2
=
C

> 0 . IfJ d(I1d_I1c)
< 0 ) lId - lI c is decreasing no matter which oj A1 or A2
dA2

-

varies from its expected value.

When d(I1;~I1C) > 0) we are still assured that the positive

effect of variable A2 is more than offset by the negative effect of variable AI. Assuming local
conditions vary from expectations by approximately the same amount) the firm is always at
least as well off centralized.

Q.E.D.

As with the result regarding non-variable local conditions, one cannot guarantee
that centralization is always more profitable than decentralization. In general, better signal
reception makes centralization more profitable, but there may be cases, even when signals
are perfect, when the firm could have done better if it were decentralized.
These two results demonstrate the role that externalities between outlets have in
affecting firm profits. Even when problems of information are solved (by perfect signals
or unchanging local conditions), decentralized outlets may impose negative (or positive)
externalities on each other through the choice of output. Because decentralized outlets are
assumed unable to communicate, these costs (benefits) cannot be eliminated through any
form of perfect information. From these two results we can conclude that developing a system
of communication between decentralized outlets would go a long way towards clarifying the
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organization's optimal choice of form. 12

3

Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

This paper has demonstrated that when flexibility matters, decentralization can increase
profitability.

On the other hand, if predictability is important, the firm will rationally

ignore local conditions.

In this case, the ability to coordinate matters, and the firm is

better off centralized. I have also shown that, given a large (constant) or rapidly increasing
cost of miscoordination, the decentralized firm will standardize as local conditions become
more variable. In the limit, the decentralized firm is completely standardized and behaves
exactly as it would in the presence of a central coordinator. I have also demonstrated that
even when signals from outlets to headquarters allow it to respond to local conditions, one
cannot conclude that centralization is always more profitable, since faulty signals may cause
headquarters to coordinate on the wrong output levels.
There are several issues of decision making authority that were not considered in this
paper. The model omitted all consideration of moral hazard, and the incentives problem a
single decision maker might face. Other issues that arise in the multi-plant firm include
economies of scale available to the centralized firm, and the information processing problem
faced by a single (possibly overburdened) decision maker. This information overload often
leads to "mixups" (giving the wrong instructions to an outlet).
Finally, I have considered only one possibility for solving problems that arise once
the organizational form is set. For many organizations successful decentralization involves
12 One possibility would be to allow outlet 2 to see the selection made by outlet 1 before X2 is chosen.
Preliminary work suggests that this does not solve the externality problem. A second possibility is to
allow outlets to make "tentative" choices which are communicated to the other outlet. This method of
communication also does not appear to solve the externality problem.
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coordinating the actions of interrelated outlets. How this is done remains an open question,
one that becomes especially relevant when the standard solution to externalities (creating a
market) is difficult. 13 Finding alternative ways for centralized organizations to respond to
local conditions is also important.
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Abstract
Multi-plant organizations have trouble including both local and global information
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Introduction

All organizations base decisions on local and global information, but when the organization
consists of several plants , it often has trouble accounting for both sets of facts. Generally,
each plant is better informed regarding conditions specific to its locality, while headquarters is better able to account for global issues affecting the coordination of outlets. Within
the organization decision-making power must be allocated, either to individual plants or to
headquarters. This creates a tradeoff between using accurate local information and coordinating outlets. This paper describes and models the tradeoff between using local information
and coordinating outlets.
Consider a firm producing several versions (brands) of the same product - automobiles, for example. Suppose that each brand is produced on a separate assembly line with ·
unique characteristics, and that communication between lines, and between lines and headquarters is limited. These assumptions suggest that detailed knowledge of the characteristics
of each brand deteriorates as it moves from that brand's line to the firm's other lines and
to headquarters.

The firm would like each line to exploit this detailed knowledge, but it

recognizes that altering the characteristics or quantities produced of one brand might reduce
sales of others, so that accounting for production conditions of one brand may have both a
positive and a negative influence on revenue.
For example, automaker Saturn has recently introduced its L-Series sedan, In an
attempt to retain customers trading in its popular (and smaller) S-Series autos. Its objective
is to move existing Saturn owners up to a larger and more expensive auto, while attracting
new customers for both types of cars it offers. There is a benefit (in terms of new customers
attracted) to meeting customer demand for a larger, more comfortable automobile, but a
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